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                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
Nos. 14-1337 and 14-1502  
    
  
IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) 
             PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
 
RANDALL D. HERMAN; RAYNA HERMAN, 
                           Appellants in 14-1337 
 
MICHAEL HIRSCHBEIN; SANDRA HIRSCHBEIN, 
         Appellants in 14-1502 
        
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Nos. 2-99-cv-20593 and 2-16-md-01203) 
District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III                        
                                                                 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 9, 2014 
 
Before:  SMITH, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 20, 2015) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Randall Herman and Michael Hirschbein (collectively, Claimants) appeal from the 
District Court’s orders, denying their claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits under the 
Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Herman and Hirschbein are members of the certified settlement class who seek 
benefits under the Settlement Agreement.  We have previously discussed the litigation 
background, Settlement Agreement terms, and significant medical issues.1  Thus, we 
limit our discussion here to the facts relevant to the present appeal. 
 In 2011, Herman and Hirschbein submitted claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits 
under the Settlement Agreement.  The AHP Settlement Trust then submitted both claims 
for audit.  The Trust subsequently denied Herman’s claim and limited Hirschbein’s claim 
to Matrix B benefits.  Specifically, the Trust credited the findings of the auditing 
cardiologists, who determined there was no reasonable basis for Herman’s treating 
physician’s representation that he had mild aortic regurgitation or Hirschbein’s treating 
physician’s representation that he did not have aortic stenosis.  Herman and Hirschbein 
both contested the Trust’s post-audit determinations but the Trust affirmed its decisions. 
 Both claimants again disputed the Trust’s findings and the Trust applied to the 
District Court to require them to show cause why their claims should be paid.  The 
District Court referred the matters to the Special Master, who appointed a Technical 
                                                 
1 See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
543 F.3d 179, 181-90 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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Advisor to prepare an independent report.  Like the auditing cardiologists, the Technical 
Advisor concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the representation that Herman 
had mild aortic regurgitation or that Hirschbein did not have aortic stenosis.  Crediting 
the Technical Advisor and auditing cardiologists’ findings, the District Court determined 
that both claimants failed to meet their burden of establishing a reasonable medical basis 
for their claims.  Thus, the District Court affirmed the denial of Herman and Hirschbein’s 
claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits.   
II.2 
 “We review a District Court’s exercise of its equitable authority to administer and 
implement a class action settlement for abuse of discretion.”3  To constitute an abuse of 
discretion, the District Court must have relied on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”4  “The test is not what 
this court would have done under the same circumstances; that is not enough.”5  
Construction of settlement agreements, however, is a question of law mandating plenary 
review.6   
 As a preliminary matter, Claimants seek plenary review because they claim that 
the threshold issue in this appeal is defining the term “reasonable medical basis.”  
According to Claimants, the District Court has not provided a rule of law or standard for 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
3 See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10.   
4 In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001).   
5 Id. (quotations omitted). 
6 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 706 
F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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determining whether a reasonable medical basis exists.  We disagree.  The District Court 
has applied the reasonable medical basis standard in a litany of past decisions, and those 
opinions are an appropriate place for guidance here.7  Although these decisions do not 
provide a one-size-fits-all definition, they offer Claimants “sufficient notice of the 
reasonable medical basis standard.”8  As a result, we consider only whether the District 
Court abused its discretion by finding that Claimants failed to meet their burden of 
establishing a reasonable medical basis for their claims. 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Herman failed to 
rebut the opinions of the auditing cardiologist and the Technical Advisor that he did not 
have mild regurgitation.  In large part, Herman stands on his own physicians’ 
affirmations, which disagree with those findings.  Disagreement, however, is not enough 
to constitute an abuse of discretion.9  Herman also argues that he met his burden by 
submitting an aortic regurgitation measurement based on more than a single frame and 
including some indication of the maximum jet’s representativeness.  Yet, Herman relies 
on a prior decision in this litigation, where we merely stated that the “identification of a 
single jet without any explanation or indication of its representativeness will not satisfy 
the claimant’s burden.”10  Claimants next claim that the auditing cardiologist’s findings 
were unreasonable because they did not include regurgitation measurements.  But 
quantitative measurement is unnecessary where, as here, an auditing cardiologist 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 2640, Pretrial Order No. 2825.       
8 See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 187 n.16.   
9 See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods., 246 F.3d at 320. 
10 See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 185. 
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indicates that regurgitation is well below the necessary threshold.11  Furthermore, 
Herman mischaracterizes the auditing cardiologist’s method for measuring Herman’s 
aortic regurgitation, and therefore Herman does not demonstrate that the cardiologist’s 
approach departed from accepted medical standards.   
 Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in determining that Hirschbein 
failed to rebut the opinions of the auditing cardiologist and the Technical Advisor that he 
had aortic stenosis.  As with Herman’s claim, Claimants mistakenly argue that the 
opinions of Hirschbein’s treating physicians are enough to compel reversal here.  They 
are not.  Similarly, Claimants argue that the District Court abused its discretion by not 
considering the representative measurements by Hirschbein’s treating physicians.  But 
the District Court conducted an extensive review of the record, and simply chose to credit 
different findings.  Lastly, Claimants’ arguments regarding the reliability of the Technical 
Advisor’s findings are misplaced. 
 III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
11 See id. at 188-89.   
